Abstract
Introduction
Recently, the use of network-based devices and services has increased gradually. Thence, security becomes an essential interest, which is acquired not only to be strong with most unknown attacks, but also to be optimized on hardware implementations or specialized applications. With these criteria, designing cipher is a cryptographic primitive approach in modern applied cryptography.
It has some designs of cipher showed their advantage, such as CIKS-1 [3] , CIKS-128 [4] , Cobra-H64 [5] , Cobra-H128 [5] … based on DDP concept; or SCO-1, SCO-2, SCO-3 [6] … based on COS; Eagle-64 [8] , Eagle-128 [7] … based on DDO concept -to enhance the DDP-based ciphers. Although there are many well-known ciphers, with different specifications and characteristics, the security of them is under consideration. COSB-128 [1] is a 128-bit block cipher with a 256-bit key, the number of round is 10. It uses the concept of fast controllable permutation blocks (CPB) and controlled operational substitution (COS). This cipher is expected to be high performance in hardware-software implementations as well as high stability with differential analysis. This paper shows that this type of ciphers is still vulnerable to related-key differential attack, and the possibility to distinguish between a 10-round COSB-128 with 128-bit random permutation through 10-round related-key difference characteristics. We propose a distinguishing attack with high probability 2 -48 , requiring data complexity of 2 50 relatedkey chosen plaintexts. This result is another study with another characteristic of relatedkey attack on COSB-128 [2] .
Description of COSB-128
First, we introduce the notations which are used in the paper.
-e i,j : 32-bit binary string in which the i th bit and j th bit are one and the others are zeroes (e.g., e 1,3 = (1, 0, 1, 0,…,0)).
-∆I r : input difference in round r.
-∆K r : round key difference in round r.
The values of control ciphers V 1 , V 2  GF (2) 192 is presented through the diagram of transformation of the control vector H, with the ciphers V i , with i = 1,2.
The output values of W j (i)  GF (2) 32 are defined:
where indices l and h denote 32 lower-order or higher-order digits of the vector transformed.
The substitution transformation G uses (A, Q), where A, Q  GF (2) 64 , Q = K 1 K 3 for odd cycles and Q = K 2 K 4 for even cycles.
A 0 = (a 1 , a 1 ,…, a n ), A 1 = (a n , a 1 ,…, a n-1 ),…, A j = (a n-j+1 ,…, a n , a 1 ,…, a n-j ), Q 0 = (q 1 , q 1 ,…, q n ),
The master key Z = (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 ) produces the round keys is given in following table. We assign to encrypt the plaintext pairs (P, P*) under the key pairs ( K, K*), in which α = P  P* = (e 64 , e 64 ), and ∆K = K  K* = (e 64 , e 64 , 0, 0); to get the corresponding ciphertext pairs (C, C*).
So, as the Table 2 ., we can construct a 10-round related-key differential characteristic α  β, in which β = (0, 0) for round 1~10 of COSB-128 with probability 2 -48 . The procedure of distinguishing attack of COSB-128 is as follows.
1. Choose a pool of 2 49 plaintext pairs (P i , P* i ) with difference α = P  P* = (e 64 , e 64 ). Then, with the chosen plaintext attack, we encrypt the plaintext pairs using (K, K*) to get the ciphertext pairs (C, C*), in which ∆K = K  K* = (e 64 , e 64 , 0, 0). 2. For each ciphertext pair (C, C*), check if C  C* = (0, 0). 3. If the number of pairs passing Step 2 is greater than or equal to 2, the given cipher texts were generated through a 10-round COSB-128. Otherwise, the given ciphertexts were generated using 128-bit random permutation.
This attack requires a pool of 2 49 plaintext pairs and data complexity is 2 50 related-key chosen plaintexts. If the given ciphertexts were generated by using a full 10-round COSB-128, this attack can distinguish between a full 10-round COSB-128 and a 128-bit random permutation with probability 1. Otherwise, the probability that the attack outputs in which the given ciphertexts were generated by using a full 10-round COSB-128 is low. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we presented the possibility to distinguish between a 10-round COSB-128 with 128-bit random permutation through 10-round related-key difference characteristics, by proposing a distinguishing attack with high probability on a full round this cipher. This attack requires a pool of 2 49 plaintext pairs and data complexity of 2 50 related-key chosen plaintexts. The method is expected to extend a related-key recovery attack on this type of ciphers in later research.
